Who decides EU policy on Gaza? (Part II)

A look at who can take the EU decisions on Gaza - regarding recognition, CSDP operations, humanitarian aid and the role of the European Parliament

The logo of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah - which has long been suspended but is dutifully renewed each year by the Council.

This is the second post in my miniseries on who decides EU policy in relations to Israel and Gaza. In the spirit of the first post, this will look firmly at the EU internal decision-making, not the conflict in Gaza itself. This second post will look at a few more specific actions under consideration or already employed by the EU, from recognition to CSDP operations, humanitarian aid and finally the question on whether the European Parliament has any role in this at all.

---

Recognition

A highly political, controversial issue is the recognition of Palestine as a state. Whereas the EU has long supported the principle of a two-state solution, but only part of its member states have recognised Palestine. Until recently, most of those were countries from Central and Eastern Europe, who did so during the Cold War, long before their EU membership. This notably includes Hungary, which today is amongst the most pro-Israel EU members.

The question of recognition has become even more controversial surrounding Israel’s conduct in Gaza. In 2024, Spain, Ireland and non-EU Norway announced their recognition, and, even more impactful, in 2025 France, the UK (under conditions) and Canada said they will recognise Palestine in September this year.

But what about the EU? Unsurprisingly, as a sui generis international institution itself, the EU itself does not have legal role in the recognition of states. However, according to this interesting article by Anne Hamonic and Cécile Rapoport, it does have a practical role in facilitating (or prohibiting) the recognition of states, by making state-like agreements with them. It may even give those of its member states, who have not recognised a particular entity as state, a venue to work with them, for example Kosovo in the case of Spain. This analysis surprised me and suggests that it is worth a closer look whether the EU does steps that could point towards treating Palestine as a state in the foreseeable future.

CSDP Operations – symbolism on another level

For the future of Gaza, French President Macron has recently put forward the idea of a UN operation. Regardless of the viability of such operation, there are indeed already two CSDP operations active in Israel and the Palestinian territories. For decision-making on them, the story is quite clear. CSDP operations are decided by the Council by unanimity, with no (major) role for the European Parliament. Even if they have agreed in the Council, member states are free to decide whether and in what size to send troops or personnel to a CSDP operation.

The bigger question is therefore how the EU was able to for years find unanimous agreement on two CSDP operations in the region? The answer is that they are both highly symbolic, but also largely invisible, which is a strange combination. The first is EUPOL COPPS, the EU Coordination Office for Palestine Police Support. Running since 2006, the operation is aimed at supporting the Palestinian authorities in building up their police. It thus does fall into the type of EU action to support state building. At around 100 people and a budget of ~€13 mio. a year, it is also very small. The operation also explicitly only operates in the Westbank and excludes Gaza.

Even more curious is EUBAM Rafah, the EU border mission for Rafah, the border crossing from Gaza to Egypt. This operation was established in 2005, but largely suspended in 2007 when Hamas took control of Gaza. Since then, the operation has been largely in hibernation, but dutifully renewed once a year by the Council by unanimity. In January 2025, when a short ceasefire took hold, the operation was actually redeployed to support a reopening of the border crossing. However, just two month later, hostilities resumed and now the operation is back in hibernation. But after almost twenty years of symbolic extensions, its time may yet come.

Humanitarian Aid

The area of humanitarian aid is a major exception to the issues covered so far. For one, here the EU has real weight, as (according to the EU Commission) the largest international donor to the Palestinian people. Since 2023, the EU has significantly increased its humanitarian aid to Gaza, citing a scope of around €450 million. The EU has also been part of setting up an air bridge to Gaza, as well as using the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism to coordinate support given by the member states.

In regards to decision-making, humanitarian aid is the real exception, in the sense that here the EU Commission has real agency. It can decided major scale ups by itself, within the general framework of the budget for EU humanitarian aid. It is also an area where the EU’s High Representative Kaja Kallas has negotiated directly with Israel over the blockade of humanitarian aid into Gaza. This negotiation has directly fed into the Council discussions on potential sanctions towards Israel, showing that – if combined smartly and if (in this case a big IF) backed up by support from the member states – the High Representative can directly engage in a core diplomatic issue on behalf of the EU.

Humanitarian aid was also the subject of a small inner institutional struggle in 2023. In October 2023, then Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Olivér Varhelyi, announced that all EU humanitarian aid to Palestine would be stopped. Varhelyi, a close ally of Viktor Orbán and Hungarian Commissioner, with this action represented a strongly pro-Israel view that was shared by few member states. After strong protests from many other EU national governments, and strong pushback from then High Representative Borrell, the EU Commission announced that the decision would be reversed. Though partially a result of Varhelyi disregarding the proper process, it showed that if divided in itself, even supranational decision-making power resting with the Commission can still result in EU cacophony.

And what about the European Parliament?

And what, you might ask, is the role of the European Parliament in all of this? As suggested by the analysis so far, mostly rather limited to voicing opinions rather than actual decision-making powers. Neither on sanctions nor recognition or CSDP operations or humanitarian aid does it have co-decision power. On the latter two, civilian CSDP operations and humanitarian aid, the EP does at least have a role over the budget.

This does usually not stop the EP from assuming the role of ‘moral compass’ of the EU and adopting normative resolutions on questions of foreign, security and defence policy. Here something interesting happened. From my searches, the EP has adopted four resolutions since 7 October 2023 regarding Israel, the first of which on 19 October 2023. This was passed by an overwhelming majority of 500 to 21, and reflected the initial reaction in the EU: Strong solidarity with Israel over Hamas terror attacks, call for return of all hostages, but already a call for a humanitarian pause in Gaza.

The second, third and fourth resolutions came in January, March and April 2024, where the mood was already shifting. With a much smaller majorities of, for instance, 312 to 131, calling for a permanent ceasefire, conditional on hostage release. On this vote, an amendment by the (traditionally pro-Israel) EPP exposed the fractions between those focusing on solidarity and the security of Israel, and those MEPs focusing on the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The vote in March, stepping up to a call for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, had 372 to 44 votes in favour, but many abstentions or just not voting, in particular from the EPP. The fourth and final vote was in April 2024 on a resolution condemning Iran for its attack on Israel and calling for de-escalation.

What is most striking to me, however, that I could not find any resolution by the new European Parliament after the June 2024 election on Israel/Gaza. There was a joint statement by the leaders of the EPP, S&D, Renew, Greens/EFA and the Left in May 2025 calling for immediate and effective international action on Gaza. More recently, the leaders of the S&D, Greens/EFA and the Left – but not the EPP or Renew – wrote to von der Leyen, Costa and Kallas calling for urgent EU and international action to “end the massacre in Gaza”, using the term ‘genocide’. There last was a discussion on ‘the situation in the Middle East’ with Council and Commission statements on 8 July 2025 in the plenary, but no tabled resolution.

Since there has been no further resolution in the EP on this, my assumption is that (in addition to summer recess of the EP) in the new European Parliament there is currently no majority for a clear resolution on Gaza.

---

This, for now, concludes my miniseries about EU decision-making on Gaza. At the end, it proved more varied than expected, even if the educated guess hold in the end: It is the national governments in the member states who call the shots, and on this complex issue they remain fully divided. But they are not the only ones divided – the episode on humanitarian aid from October 2024 showed the Commission can also be divided in areas where it has more agency. Even the European Parliament, whose resolutions are most symbolic, has last found a majority for a resolution on Gaza in the first half of 2024, despite the strong public interest in the issue.

PS: I know this is a sensitive topic. Constructive comments, corrections and additions are very welcome, but please keep polite.