Who decides EU policy on Gaza? (Part I)

A look at who can take the EU decisions on Gaza - regarding statements, positions in international organisations and sanctions

Open any social media post of the EU leadership these days - be it Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa or High Representative Kaja Kallas - and almost regardless of the original topic, the answers are full of accusations of the EU not doing enough over Gaza.

Here is a personal admission: I have long refrained from commenting anything in public over the EU’s policy on Israel, Gaza or the wider Middle East, because I am convinced that should be up to the experts on the region. A region with so many fiendishly complex conflicts I (and far too many commentators) know very little about. But while reading many of the recent articles on internal EU divisions over Israel/Gaza, for instance regarding the suspension of Israeli participation in Horizon Europe, I found myself wondering – which actors can actually take the main EU decisions on Israel/Gaza?

In this post, I want to have a surface level look at several of the main issues debated within the EU since Hamas’ terror attack of 7 October 2023, and the subsequent Israeli response. Per principle above, I will keep strictly to looking at the EU’s internal decision-making procedures.

For those, my educated guess going in was that the major players on the EU’s Israel/Gaza policy are the member states deciding by unanimity, as is usual in EU Foreign and Security Policy. The deeper look shows this broadly to be true, though with some notable exceptions:

Public Statements & Council Conclusions

A first expression of EU positioning on a foreign affairs issue are the statements given out by EU institutions. They are infamous for the EU declaring itself concerned, so much that there even is a dedicated X account on that (unfortunately no bluesky, yet).

Two different kinds of institutional statements are of particular importance: First, on a lower level, there are the statements and declarations by the EU High Representative. Since 7 October 2023, there have been 154 statements by the EU High Representative, the EEAS Spokesperson and individual Commissioners, which at least mentioned Gaza. The important point about these is that the High Representative can, in principle, give out these statements on her or his own. As Josep Borrell found out, however, the statements are worth very little if not backed up by EU willingness to act, as he made increasingly hawkish statements on Israel towards the end of his mandate without full backup of the EU, to very little effect.

The exception, then, are statements “on behalf of the EU”, which all EU member states have to approve. These carry more heft, as they signal at least a unified position. Tellingly, the most recent explicit High Representative statement on behalf of the EU, thus with the backing from all member states, on Gaza is more than half a year old, from January 2025, welcoming the short lived ceasefire in Gaza. There is a more recent statement on behalf the EU concerning UNESCO, which mentions Gaza in passing, but tellingly, the statement is on behalf of the EU and only 26 member states. Who is missing? As so often, Hungary.

On a higher political level, the EU expresses its positions in conclusions from the Foreign Affairs Council, or, at the top, the European Council. Here the story is straightforward: Any of these conclusions require the unanimous consent of all member states, so that everyone has a veto. This can lead to deep diplomatic negotiations on whether the EU should call for a ‘humanitarian pause’ or (in Plural) ‘humanitarian pauses’.

Looking at the data, one thing you cannot fault the EU is for not meeting often enough to discuss Israel, Gaza and the situation in the Middle East. Since October 2023, so about less than two years, the issue has been discussed at six European Council meetings, and (by my count) 18 Foreign Affairs Council meetings.

Yet overall, the ability to speak for the EU gives some leeway to Kallas as well as von der Leyen and Costa. But if they want to make their voice count, and really speak on behalf of the EU, they need the explicit backing of the national governments.

Voting in international organisations

How much worth these united statements are is also expressed in other international organizations, where EU member states act in a sovereign fashion. Although the EU treaties commit them to loyal cooperation, at the end of the day, it is the national governments who decide their countries positions.

And here, looking at UN General Assembly votes can be instrumental. From 7 October 2023 onwards, several resolutions have been passed by the UNGA on Israel/Gaza. On these, the EU member states were usually split in all three ways. For instance, on the 27^th October 2023, in a UNGA resolution calling for the protection of civilians and upholding legal and humanitarian obligations, of the EU-27, 10 member states voted in favour, 13 abstained and 4 voted against it. So, the complete opposite of a united position.

Over the course of the last almost two years, and the many EU meetings touched above, the unity only slightly improved. In the most recent UNGA resolution vote, demanding an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire, 23 EU members voted in favour, 3 abstained (Czechia, Romania and Slovakia), with only Hungary voting against it.

Sanctions – suspension of Israel’s participation in Horizon Europe

Of course, there is a lot the EU can say, but at the end of the day, it matters what it does. Increasingly, the discussion here is turning towards some kind of sanctions towards Israel regarding its conduct in Gaza.

The legal route for regular sanctions is a Council decision via Art. 29 TEU, often together with a Council Regulation and/or Implementing Council Regulation, depending on the subject (see here the whole host of documents part of the recent 18^th sanctions package vis-à-vis Russia). The key is the respective Council decision, which – as usual in CFSP – requires unanimity and is a decision by the Council alone, with no role for the European Parliament.

In practice, however, the EU is not discussing Russia-type sanctions on Israel regarding Gaza, which would very likely not get anything close to unanimous support. In the focus of discussions are much more removing benefits of existing cooperation between the EU and Israel. And here it is where it gets (institutionally) interesting.

The most concrete current discussion is about a partial suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, for instance concerning its participation in the EU’s Horizon Europe research programme. After much internal pressure, the Commission put forward a proposal for a Council Decision on suspending Israel’s participation in Horizon Europe at the end of July 2025. This decision, if taken, is proposed to be based on Art. 218 (9) TFEU, which allows the Council to adopt such a suspension, by a Council Decision with qualified majority. However, Art. 218 (8) TFEU stipulates that decisions for the adoption of association agreements require unanimity.

In consequence, there is a legal debate on whether the suspension of association agreements, including that between the EU and Israel, requires unanimity, or, as argued here by Merjin Chamon on the Verfassungsblog, qualified majority. The interpretation of Art. 218 (9) TFEU is therefore crucial whether a majority of member states suffices, or each one has a veto.

Politically, my assumption is that on such a sensitive issue, the Council would negotiate as long as possible to get unanimity. However, qualified majority would allow a decision against single national government, with again Hungary, which is traditionally strongly supportive of Israel, as the prime candidate.

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While writing, this became even longer than I planned, so I decided to split the analysis in two parts. This concludes part I, which broadly supported the educated guess:

It is the national governments in the member states who call the shots, even if the EU High Representative or the Commission President have some leeway for their own statements. But those, of course, do not bind member states at international organisations. Most interestingly, there is some potential room for qualified majority decisions outvoting individual member states on the suspension of parts of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which might become important in the near future.

Part II will likely follow next week, with a look at the issue of recognition, the CSDP operations in Gaza/Palestine and what, if any, role the European Parliament can play in all this.

If you enjoyed this analysis, also have a look at my first post on EU policy-making in July 2025 and subscribe to get the follow-up next week.

Best,

Nicolai

PS: I know this is a sensitive topic. Constructive comments, corrections and additions are very welcome, but please keep polite.